Fyodor Dostoevsky

A Tragicomedy of Defiance: Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground

| Tyran Grillo

Published in 1864, Notes from Underground enters the nineteenth century through a wound in its confidence. Russia’s arguments over human emancipation had become arguments over the human creature itself, over whether an enlightened understanding of self-interest could make goodness inevitable. Dostoevsky places a solitary voice inside that promise and allows it to gnaw through the floor. The result anticipates the estrangement of later modernist fiction and the problems existentialism would make its own, yet its historical force remains inseparable from its peculiar intimacy. The novel makes consciousness a place where the future can be refused before it arrives. Its speaker possesses enough intelligence to expose the arrogance of a system and enough vanity to turn that exposure into an excuse for tormenting others. These capacities occupy the same cramped body. Their coexistence gives the book its terrible vitality.

Even its chronology refuses the reassurance of a straight line. The first part presents the underground man at forty, elaborating the convictions with which he has upholstered his seclusion. The second, “Apropos of the Wet Snow,” returns to his life at twenty-four. We encounter the philosophy before the experiences against which it has hardened, then discover how much flesh has been concealed inside its abstractions. This reversal changes the meaning of what we have already read. Arguments that initially resemble a defense of human freedom acquire the odor of an alibi, while episodes of humiliation expose the needs that theory has learned to disguise. His earlier life never becomes a simple explanation of his later consciousness, since the older man retains control of the telling and continues to dispute his own evidence. Memory enters stage left under escort. The book’s two halves form a struggle over interpretation in which a life keeps escaping the conclusions imposed upon it. The philosopher has delivered his speech. Now someone must pay for it.

“I am a sick man…I am a wicked man.” Between those declarations, the narrative opens its cynical caesura. Sickness might solicit care, whereas wickedness seems to forbid it, and the speaker cannot resist arranging both possibilities before us. Translators Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky preserve the nervous immediacy of a voice that has scarcely announced itself before beginning to revise the announcement. The man believes his liver is diseased, although he admits uncertainty about what ails him. His refusal to consult a doctor becomes an act of spite whose only injured party is himself. Already the comedy has begun its patient work upon our sympathy. Who is supposed to suffer from this magnificent refusal? The doctors will survive it. He knows this and insists upon it anyway, extracting sovereignty from the prospect of getting worse. His body becomes the hostage of an argument addressed to nobody who needs to answer. In that opening hesitation, a whole existence curls around the pleasure of making its own misery ungovernable.

Pevear’s introduction cautions against mistaking the narrator’s proximity for a direct statement of Dostoevsky’s beliefs. The caution matters because this man knows how to recruit a reader. His “gentlemen” are an imagined audience whose objections he can supply before they arrive, a tribunal assembled from the educated assumptions he despises and the approval he cannot stop desiring. They often embody the rationalist confidence associated with Nikolai Gavrilovich Chernyshevsky and his followers, although their function exceeds any single historical party. The reader who laughs becomes another occupant of that audience, while withholding laughter merely invites speculation about the motive for our refusal. Whatever we do, he has already begun discussing us with himself. We are invited into his consciousness under conditions that make every response available for confiscation, and his apparent candor gives the confiscation its charm. He courts attention through declarations of indifference, finding in our resistance another reason to continue.

Chernyshevsky’s What Is to Be Done?, published in 1863, supplied the radical imagination with a utopian fiction that became a formative text for revolutionary readers. Its rational egoism proposed that a proper understanding of self-interest could bring individual benefit into harmony with the common good. Notes from Underground attacks that assurance and parodies the confidence that human life can be reorganized according to a comprehensible plan. A proverbial crystal palace condenses the promise into an architecture of perfected satisfaction. From the underground man’s corner, its transparency looks suffocating. The danger he identifies concerns the reduction of lived existence to a calculable mechanism, an arrangement in which human flesh remains present while its freedom has been explained away. Yet the rival he installs beneath this edifice is hardly a trustworthy liberator. A grievance has seized the emergency exit and declared itself the guardian of the soul.

His strongest objection begins with the possibility that a person might knowingly choose injury. If human conduct follows enlightened advantage, what becomes of the pleasure of refusing advantage itself? “What makes you conclude that man’s wanting so necessarily needs to be corrected?” he asks in kind. The question pierces the benevolence that appoints itself curator of someone else’s desire. Wanting may embrace reason, but it can also insist upon a satisfaction that reason has no wish to recognize. To preserve this troublesome remainder, the underground man will defend even a ruinous caprice, musing to himself, if not also about himself, “I even think the best definition of man is: a being that goes on two legs and is ungrateful.” The sentence is wonderfully indecent. Gratitude would acknowledge that the world has given us something worth accepting, and his creature reserves the right to spit upon the gift. Such ingratitude can expose coercion decoratively wrapped in generosity. It can also become the reflex by which every offered kindness is ruined before it has the chance to make a claim upon us. His defense of freedom carries both possibilities in its mouth.

Arithmetic therefore acquires a menace disproportionate to its innocence. Two times two is four, and the underground man hears in that result the shutting of a door. The equation becomes intolerable when its certainty is promoted into a model of existence, when the unresolved human creature is treated as a problem awaiting its final solution. A completed life would have no room left in which to want. “And though our life in this manifestation often turns out to be a bit of trash,” he goes on to say, “still it is life and not just the extraction of a square root.” Destruction consequently offers the strange consolation of reopening what completion has sealed. He suspects that people may overturn a perfectly furnished happiness simply to feel their own hands at work upon it. Here his argument finds an unsettling strength, for increased knowledge supplies no automatic moral improvement. A civilization can condemn bloodshed while becoming more accomplished at committing it. Reason may sharpen an instrument whose purpose remains atrocious. But the very force of this insight tempts him toward a disastrous privilege, allowing the refusal of reason to appear honorable regardless of what that refusal does. Freedom begins to resemble a house whose owner burns each room to prove that the keys are his.

Within that house, consciousness proliferates until movement becomes nearly impossible. Every intention produces a witness against itself. Revenge requires an injury that can be believed in long enough to justify acting upon it, yet analysis keeps dissolving the belief. A motive reveals another motive beneath it, and the excavation continues until the ground has vanished. His intelligence discovers contingency everywhere, then awards itself a distinction for being unable to stand. The “characterless being” he calls morally obligatory becomes a person whose capacity to imagine alternatives has swallowed the possibility of choosing among them. There is real anguish here, as well as a peculiar snobbery. He cannot become an insect, but even this failure can be made into evidence of exceptional depth. The confession keeps returning a dividend to the vanity that financed it. Each admission of worthlessness is quietly stamped with the assurance that an ordinary man could never understand such worthlessness so well.

The stone wall of natural necessity provides a further occasion for this divided pleasure. A direct person can accept a limit and proceed within it. The underground man continues to suffer against the wall even after conceding that he cannot break through. Acceptance would deprive him of the quarrel through which he feels himself existing. His “voluptuous standstill in inertia” is filled with imaginary reprisals, many of them exquisitely revised and none capable of exhausting the offense. Action would expose revenge to the indifference of an actual world. In fantasy, the grievance retains an obedient audience and a limitless duration. Even suffering becomes theatrical, as his reflections on toothache suggest. A cultivated sufferer can make a moan accuse everyone within hearing, turning pain into a demand that others should be inconvenienced by its existence. Dostoevsky lets us laugh at the grotesque ingenuity of this arrangement. The laughter catches unpleasantly in the throat when we recognize how easily the wish to be understood becomes a wish to punish those who have failed to understand us.

Dreams offer the apparent escape. There he can inhabit the “beautiful and lofty” without submitting his grandeur to the humiliating conditions of an encounter. His imagined heroism excuses his degradation, and the degradation gives his heroism something sufficiently immense to redeem. Ordinary decency would spoil the arrangement by asking for an action too small to furnish an epic. The dreamer needs humanity at a distance, where love can expand without meeting another person’s inconvenient will. This is one reason the novel’s collision of the sentimental aspirations of the 1840s with the rationalist programs of the 1860s feels so corrosive. Both provide languages through which a person can substitute an ideal for an encounter. The underground man inhabits their incompatibility, dressing his hunger in whichever vocabulary will make it appear most impressive.

That condition has a disquieting contemporary echo. The imagined “gentlemen” anticipate the audience before whom a person can spend an entire life preparing reactions to reactions. Social media gives such anticipation a visible apparatus, but Dostoevsky locates the deeper machinery in the desire to secure recognition while retaining control over what recognition may reveal. His protagonist rehearses exposure until it becomes another means of concealment. He can confess to vanity with such conspicuous intelligence that the confession begins to demand admiration. His contradictions draw us into a relation where we enjoy detecting the trap and continue supplying it with victims. To call him simply unreliable hardly reaches the problem. We often perceive his evasions correctly and remain susceptible to their pleasure. Reading becomes an experiment in how far insight can coexist with complicity. The man keeps asking whether we are laughing because laughter gives him both the wound he expects and the contact he requires.

Pevear and Volokhonsky make this entanglement audible through an English that permits the voice its awkward insistence. The repeated language of “profit” gives desire a commercial shadow, allowing the attack on rational self-interest to remain entangled with the terms of its opponent. “Wanting” preserves an ordinary bodily pressure that a more elevated vocabulary could too easily dignify. Even the phrase “little debauch” carries the faint absurdity of a speaker attempting to manage his disgrace through scale. These choices matter because the book’s thinking takes place inside speech that keeps slipping out of its speaker’s control. Sudden qualifications interfere with an assertion before it can settle into authority. A joke exposes an intention the narrator immediately tries to reinterpret. The intellectual violence depends upon these abrasions. In this translation, his voice retains the feeling of a thought catching on its own teeth, producing an eloquence whose injuries remain visible.

When the second part returns to the young clerk, those verbal injuries acquire a social history. “I was then already bearing the underground in my soul,” he admits. Office life makes his body a surface upon which he imagines everyone else reading contempt. Another person’s face can seem an intolerable judgment before a word has been spoken. The encounter with an officer who physically moves him aside crystallizes the misery of being treated as an obstacle without the dignity of an antagonist. His elaborate preparations to collide with the officer on equal terms make a small contact of shoulders bear the weight of an entire metaphysics of recognition. He longs to establish that his body occupies space with the same right as the body of a man whose rank makes room for it. The humor is agonizing because the desired equality has been reduced to a gesture that may scarcely register with its recipient.

His reunion with former schoolmates enlarges this collision into a social catastrophe. At Simonov’s rooms, he insists upon joining a farewell dinner for Zverkov, a man whose easy confidence he resents with the intimacy of an old scar. He needs these men to acknowledge his superiority and cannot bear to leave them to their indifference. When the dinner’s changed hour is not communicated to him, an hour of waiting becomes proof of the insignificant place he occupies in their lives. Their eventual arrival briefly relieves the loneliness that his pride has been preparing to denounce. As the evening deteriorates, he drinks and attempts to force the gathering into the drama he has rehearsed. His insulting toast brings ridicule, while his prolonged pacing gives the room a miserable pendulum. Everyone else possesses the terrible freedom to stop thinking about him. He remains, making his refusal to leave an exhibition of the dependence he wishes to conceal. Dostoevsky’s wit here works through duration. We feel how long it takes a man to discover that humiliation can continue after the spectators have become bored.

He follows them to a brothel with revenge still furnishing imaginary scenes, and there he encounters Liza, a young woman whose vulnerability offers him an audience he can command. His conversation with her borrows the moral intensity of sentimental literature. He evokes the tenderness of a family and confronts her with a future of abandonment, making himself the apparent bearer of a knowledge that might save her. Some of the feeling is sincere, which deepens the harm. A person can speak truthfully about another’s suffering while using that truth to establish power over her. He needs Liza’s tears to compensate for the contempt he has just endured, and his borrowed eloquence supplies the instrument. The human body he has defended against rational calculation is now being reorganized under the pressure of his own design. Her destination seems so clear to him that the use of fear to drive her toward it can pass for benevolence. His account of freedom has found a listener whose freedom it can temporarily forget.

Liza’s observation that he speaks from a book touches the apparatus at its most vulnerable point. She has heard the borrowed cadence beneath the apparent revelation. He resents the exposure because his authority depends upon the illusion that these words come directly from a depth inaccessible to other people. Literature has supplied him with a personality he can perform, and her remark briefly separates the performance from the person. Nevertheless, he gives her his address, extending the scene into the prospect of an actual relation. An address is a dangerous thing to offer when one’s grandeur exists mainly in speech. It translates a promise into a place where the promising person can be found. The underground man begins to dread the arrival that his own rhetoric has invited. Liza may come expecting the man who spoke to her, and encounter the room in which that man has never managed to live.

Her visit finds him in the midst of a degrading struggle with his servant Apollon, whose composure has become another provocation to his vanity. The ragged dressing gown completes an exposure that the narrator had anticipated with feverish precision. His fear of being seen as poor mixes with the more intimate fear of being seen as helpless. The rescuer has been discovered in need of rescue, and Liza responds to that need. She recognizes his unhappiness and embraces him. For a moment, something enters the scene that his rehearsal could neither produce nor prevent. Her compassion changes the relation between them without asking him to become impressive first. He sobs, then begins to perceive this reversal as another humiliation. The possibility of being loved in his misery threatens the superiority through which he has imagined love becoming bearable. Care reaches him at the very point where his elaborate defenses have made care seem an insult. To accept it would require allowing another person’s understanding to exist beyond his authority.

He answers by asserting mastery through their intimacy, then presses money into her hand in a final attempt to degrade what she has offered. The gesture tries to assign her a familiar price and restore a hierarchy in which he can remain the purchaser. Here the first part’s language of profit returns with an appalling material exactness. Having defended the human creature against every formula that would fix its value, he attempts to reduce Liza to a transaction the instant her tenderness exceeds his calculations. Her refusal of the money leaves his arithmetic stranded on the table. The banknote has become an object his interpretation cannot successfully spend. We should resist turning this refusal into a tidy victory, since the injury has already occurred and her future remains unknown. Yet it interrupts his dominion over the meaning of the encounter. He cannot make the gift into a purchase merely by deciding that it shall be one. Another will has answered him, and the answer survives without the argumentative extravagance he requires to make his own refusals feel alive.

The episode changes the philosophical stakes of the novel. A defense of unrestricted wanting has met the wanting of someone else, exposing the ease with which liberty can be made into a private license. The underground man can identify the coercion hidden in a utopian scheme while practicing an intimate version of that coercion himself. His failure complicates the defense of freedom without canceling it. Liza’s refusal gives that freedom a form he cannot bear to recognize. The later Crime and Punishment permits a path toward repentance to appear in its epilogue. Here remorse keeps getting recruited into the narrator’s performance, granting him the agitation of a conscience without requiring its obedience. Dostoevsky’s Christianity makes the encounter especially charged. In a March 1864 letter to his brother Mikhail, he complained that the censors had removed material in which he derived “the necessity of faith and Christ.” The surviving text leaves that stated intention without a fully preserved expression. Liza’s compassion nevertheless permits a Christian reading of the encounter, offering an answer to the self’s enclosure that the narrator cannot accept. Love would place him in a relation whose value depends upon neither his triumph nor his abasement. He continues to translate that possibility into a contest, then punishes the person who momentarily made the contest unnecessary.

The closing reflections on embodied life bring this failure into a stranger register. “We’re stillborn, and have long ceased to be born of living fathers,” he writes, extending his condition into an accusation against a humanity ashamed of possessing its own bodies. His “omni-men” pursue an existence purified of the vulnerability through which an actual person can be reached. Such a creature could possess every possibility while never enduring the irreversible smallness of one life. The underground man’s continual revisions enact the seduction of that fantasy. Each version of himself can be exchanged for another. But Liza has entered the record with a body he can hurt, and this body prevents his plurality from remaining an innocent intellectual abundance. His freedom of interpretation cannot travel backward into her experience and undo it. Time has preserved something his rhetoric would prefer to keep negotiable. A life has consequences even when its author refuses to settle upon a character.

Perhaps this is where the novel’s deepest unease passes beyond its humble cast of characters. His final wish to speak for everyone gives us reason to look toward the person he has struggled to make into an explanation of himself. Liza’s departure opens a space he cannot fill without further invention. We know almost nothing of the life that might await her, and the temptation to furnish it with a redemptive destiny would repeat his assumption that her existence owes us a useful meaning. Her suffering need not educate him in order to matter. Neither must she remain forever at the point where his cruelty left her. The thought becomes difficult precisely where it becomes generous, asking us to imagine a future while surrendering possession of its contents. Somewhere in that unclaimed possibility, the stillborn argument loosens its hold upon the living. There may be a room in which his voice has never sounded, where no sentence requires her to become the heroine of his unhappiness. We can grant her that room without furnishing it. The door remains hers.

A Stone in the Water: Tracing the Ripple Effects of Dostoevsky’s The Idiot

| Tyran Grillo

The highway of the upright is to depart from evil:
he that keepeth his way preserveth his soul.
–Proverbs 16:17

Most novels proceed as a river does—flowing from source to mouth, obedient to the order of time, accumulating its inevitable dams, docks, and diversions along the way. The Idiot, however, is no such river. Dostoevsky drops his protagonist into the current not to drift but to disturb, thus revealing the eddies and whirlpools that form around innocence when it trespasses into the murky waters of high society. That first drop lands Prince Lev Nikolaevich Myshkin—and by extension, the reader—on a train bound for Petersburg. He is fresh from a Swiss sanatorium, where for four years he has been treated for epilepsy. His fellow travelers—Parfyon Semyonovich Rogozhin, newly enriched and drunk on inheritance, and the gossiping Lukyan Timofeevich Lebedev—are the first to be caught in his wake. Rogozhin, with the tactless curiosity of a man ruled by appetite, asks whether the prince is a “fancier of the female sex.” When Myshkin denies it, Rogozhin replies, “[Y]ou come out as a holy fool, Prince, and God loves your kind!” Thus is the first stone cast into the still pond of Myshkin’s effect, its ripples reaching outward in mockery and awe alike.

Soon, the prince finds himself in the home of Ivan Fyodorovich Epanchin, though it is toward Epanchin’s wife, Elizaveta Prokofyevna, that his lineage tenuously connects him. Within moments, he becomes an object of curiosity, as if his very simplicity were some divine riddle. The Epanchins and their daughters draw near him not from affection but fascination; his every word seems to hang in the air long after it has been spoken. So begins the novel’s great fractal of human encounters, each scene branching into another with the stubborn logic of fate.

Translator Richard Pevear observes that, though The Idiot is unanchored to place, it is never abstract. Every room, every parlor and garden, serves as a shell into which the living organism of the narrative crawls. The spaces are cramped, yet within them Dostoevsky builds an architecture of the soul. Each wall is a moral boundary, each window a glimpse into depravity.

The most cavernous of these shells is Lizaveta Prokofyevna herself—“a hotheaded and passionate lady,” who, “without thinking long, would sometimes raise all anchors and set out for the open sea without checking the weather.” In her temperament, we glimpse the embryonic forms of her three daughters: the sensible Alexandra, the artistic Adelaida, and the beautiful, capricious Aglaya. Orbiting them are other satellites of this anxious universe: Rogozhin, the merchant whose newfound wealth becomes license for cruelty; Lebedev, the self-proclaimed “professor of the Antichrist,” who reads the signs of apocalypse in the iron veins of Europe’s railroads; and, most haunting of all, Nastasya Filippovna Barashkov, the fallen specter, whose trauma becomes the crucible of the entire tale. She is distance made flesh: adored by men, despised by women, yet pitied by both.

At the trembling center of this constellation burns Myshkin himself—a sun both fragile and inexhaustible. His presence exposes others as a mirror does, revealing the distortions they cannot bear to face. “I really came only so as to get to know people,” he says to the Epanchins, a confession so plain it becomes profound. In that aim to understand the human heart lies the novel’s central pulse.

From his first conversation, Myshkin unveils the spiritual burden of consciousness. He speaks of men awaiting execution, drawing on Dostoevsky’s own brush with the firing squad: “Take a soldier, put him right in front of a cannon during a battle, and shoot at him, and he’ll still keep hoping; but read that same soldier a sentence for certain, and he’ll lose his mind or start weeping.” The words tremble with prophetic weight, foreshadowing the undoing of characters condemned not by law but by their own desires.

Lizaveta and her daughters listen as if to a visitation. Myshkin, recalling his lonely youth, declares, “Nothing should be concealed from children on the pretext that they’re little and it’s too early for them to know. What a sad and unfortunate idea!” Yet the world he enters treats him precisely as such a child: harmless, ignorant, to be humored and dismissed. “The risen sun,” the narrator tells us, “softened and brightened everything for a moment,” and so it is with Myshkin: his light briefly transforms, though it cannot redeem.

When he first beholds Nastasya’s portrait, he perceives in her a soul both contemptuous and simple-hearted, “filled with suffering.” Her name, from anastasis (resurrection), bespeaks her torment: the lamb whose innocence was traded for the amusement of nonbelievers. Like him, she is called “crazy,” though her madness is but the logical end of a world that mistakes cruelty for sophistication.

Even Myshkin’s name bears contradiction: from mysh, meaning “mouse,” and Lev, or lion. In Dostoevsky’s notebooks, beside sketches of the novel, appear two words umbilically connected: “Prince-Christ.” And yet, Myshkin does not forgive sin; he merely reveals it by existing. To Nastasya, he says, “I am nothing, but you have suffered and have emerged pure from such a hell, and that is a lot.” Thus, he grants her what theology cannot: recognition.

His influence spreads like contagion. “I believe God brought you to Petersburg from Switzerland precisely for me,” exclaims Lizaveta, and though she speaks in self-interest, she unknowingly sheds veracity. Myshkin is brought not for one but for all. When he visits Rogozhin’s home, he beholds a copy of Hans Holbein the Younger’s Christ in the Tomb, that merciless painting of the dead Savior, devoid of light or transcendence. “A man could even lose his faith from that painting!” says the prince. Rogozhin, missing the irony, takes him at his word. Myshkin explains: “[H]owever many books I’ve read on the subject, it has always seemed to me that they were talking or writing books that were not at all about that.” He concludes that “the essence of religious feeling doesn’t fit in with any reasoning… there’s something else here… that atheisms will eternally glance off.” Dostoevsky thus holds up the Russian heart, trembling with contradictions, as both the disease and the cure: a heart that forgets the Father even as it cries out for Him.

If The Idiot has often been called satire, it is only because its realism is too acute to endure. It captures the narcissism of the upper classes with the precision of a surgeon and the patience of a saint. Myshkin’s self-awareness is his shield: “What sort of idiot am I now, when I myself understand that I’m considered an idiot?” he asks, deflating mockery by acknowledging it. Like Eminem’s self-flagellation in 8 Mile—if one may indulge a modern echo—he disarms his accusers through confession, transforming insult into revelation. What they cannot abide is not his foolishness but his love.

This love, however, is tested to absurdity. When an impostor by the name of Antip Burdovsky demands a share of the prince’s inheritance under false pretenses, Myshkin offers it anyway. Though exposed as a fraud, Burdovsky still receives the prince’s charity, for in Myshkin’s eyes, deceit and misfortune are twins. Such naivety is his virtue, his madness, and his crown of thorns.

In a later gathering, one Evgeny Pavlych recounts a murder trial in which the lawyer excuses the killer’s actions as “natural” under poverty. This comment provokes nods and murmurs of agreement among those assembled, to which Lizaveta responds by accusing them of being vainglorious madmen who have turned their back on God and Christ. She lambastes them for harping on the “woman question,” which haunts the novel with its articulation of women’s desires vis-à-vis the men in their lives: “You acknowledge that society is savage and inhuman because it disgraces a seduced girl… But if she’s been hurt, why, then, do you yourselves bring her out in front of that same society and demand that it not hurt her!” It is a sermon worthy of record, and yet it vanishes in the noise of polite indifference.

Among the assembled is Ippolit Terentyev, a dying youth whose intellect burns as his body fails. His “Necessary Explanation,” a swan song in letter form that he insists on reading aloud, is both confession and defiance. “People are created to torment each other,” he proclaims. Confronting the same Holbein painting, he asks, “[H]ow could they believe, looking at such a corpse, that this sufferer would resurrect?” and later, “Can something that has no image come as an image?” For Ippolit, faith is cruelty postponed. “Let consciousness be lit up by the will of a higher power,” he muses, “and let that power suddenly decree its annihilation… let it be so.” His despair is a dark parody of Myshkin’s compassion: both see too clearly to live comfortably among men.

Myshkin, whose “head worked quite distinctly, though his soul was sick,” stands apart. Love is denied him not by fate but by incompatibility with a world that feeds on contradiction. His tenderness for Aglaya withers into disillusion; his pity for Nastasya curdles into dread. Like a puzzle piece that almost fits, he must be left aside until the picture itself changes.

And what of the others? They collapse one by one under the weight of their vanity, leaving the prince almost alone, a gold-foiled icon among ruins.

In one of the novel’s most terrifying moments, Dostoevsky describes Myshkin’s seizure: “A dreadful, unimaginable scream, unlike anything, bursts from the breast… it may even seem as if someone else were screaming from inside the man.” The cry is metaphysical; it is the scream of all creation recognizing itself. To read The Idiot is to experience that seizure, to awaken, trembling, in the aftermath of one’s own delusions. Its absurdity, like its truth, is more real than reality itself. Dostoevsky does not offer resolution; he offers revelation. And when we close the book, the echo of that scream remains: terrible, holy, and alive.

Getting Some Air: Gasping Through Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment

| Tyran Grillo

But thou, when thou prayest, enter into thy closet, and when thou hast shut thy door, pray to thy Father which is in secret, and thy Father which seeth in secret shall reward thee openly.
–Matthew 6:6

Rodion Romanovich Raskalnikov is a murderer. To say as much is to betray everything and nothing about Crime and Punishment, the plot of which he is the central protagonist. But what has he—and will he—become? Such is the bigger question Fyodor Dostoevsky examines throughout his 1866 masterpiece.

In its opening act, we see enough of Raskalnikov’s contemplations to know that he is an unsettled individual, one who lives in the shadows because there is so little light to be had. Stepping out from his rented closet one hot July evening, “as if indecisively,” he is already waist-deep in melancholia. His modest lodgings do not constitute a place of rest or meditation. If anything, he has turned the Bible verse quoted above on its head. Rather than pray to the Father, he throws the doors of his heart wide open to the Devil, whose ever-encroaching impulses are given the freedom to sow themselves in his soil and absorb the tainted nutrients of his self-aggrandizement.

It is no surprise that the first words he utters are not to a friend, a person on the street, or to us. Rather, they are to himself. Internal dialogue is his magnetic north, and in following it, he leads us by proxy into a web of characters so electric and alive (even, if not especially, those hurtling toward death) that his fate can only be an object of our curiosity. Before we get to know him, he is already wondering: “Am I really capable of that?” thus alluding, of course, to the murder he has already contemplated and played out in his head and which, almost in the same breath, he dismisses as fantasy. And yet, fantasy is more than the realization of a desire. It is the very force by which he learns to desire. So strong is this drive that he begins to question whether it comes from within or from without. “If not reason, then the devil!” he spits forth, pitting the impulse to kill in a false dichotomy. So, too, does the Devil cloak himself in reason.

Or, more accurately, if not pure reason, then its tainted cousin of casuistry, the process by which the baseless effort to justify immorality becomes a self-fulfilling Ouroboros. This is why we so often find Raskalnikov talking to himself and why passersby take him to be a careless drunk. In his mind, the answers to all moral questions have been primed and ready but must be taken by force to ring true. Ironically, this may just be the most genuine thing about him.

Of the catalytic murder, the victim of which, Alyona Ivanovna, is universally hated for her shady pawnbrokering and abusive nature, we are given a relatively brief and merciless account, so that by the time the deed is done, we are invited to regard it with visceral dismissal. In the subsequent adrenaline rush, he becomes enchanted by its unfolding, as well as by the fact that an unsuspecting second victim had to be involved after walking in on the scene in progress. The translator’s introduction rightly puts it this way: “Crime and Punishment is a highly unusual mystery novel: the most mystified character in it is the murderer himself.”

That said, one would be mistaken in thinking that Raskalnikov’s torment is a result of his heinous crime. He has been in its clutches long before we first encounter him. It did not come pouring in from a tear in the fabric of time the moment he wielded that fatal axe. It is the result of the exhausting back and forth between his heart and soul that has besought him since childhood. Hence, the dream he has early on in the novel, in which he takes the form of a boy regarding a crowd of drunken rabble-rousers in the rural town where he grew up. Fearful of their coarseness, he clings to his father, a figure now absent in his life and perhaps already a model of indifference then. One of the men launches into a verbal tirade that culminates in him beating a horse to death in full view of the assembled onlookers. Young Raskalnikov cannot bear the sight, and neither can his adult self. After the dream, “the mere thought of it made me vomit in realityand plunged me into horror,” even while knowing that the manner in which the horse was dispatched reflects his desire to carry out the same. Furthermore, on the night of the murder, we are told, “never for a single moment during the whole time could he believe in the feasibility of his designs,” as if this were an excuse for their imminent manifestation.

It is significant, too, that the killer in his dream should be named Mikolka, a diminutive of Nikolas that means “victory of the people.” It conveys, in no uncertain terms, that if the destitute are to find a way out of their predicament, it must be done through violence. All of which points to a sociopolitical subtext that becomes more familiar as the narrative progresses. It is the very idealism that has buried its talons in Raskalnikov’s mind to the point of needing to overthrow the established mechanisms of power under which he knows order and, to risk belaboring the word, reason. He wants so much to rank among the “geniuses” who inhabit his waking thoughts, when he is still nothing more than the dreamed-of boy seeking refuge in his father in the face of senseless killing.

Various names, it turns out, are equally emblematic of inner tensions. Raskolnikov, for one, comes from the word raskolnik, meaning “schismatic,” referring to religious separatism while also implying a splitting of self. And then there is the friend from his university days, Dmitri Prokofich Razumikhin, whose surname means “to bring to reason.” Indeed, it is Razumikhin who cuts to the quick of our antihero with almost indulgent aplomb as he strives to “make a human being out of you, after all.” It is also he who helps us throw the parameters of his decrepit reunitee’s worldview into relief. According to said worldview, he observes, “crime is a protest against the abnormality of the social order—that alone and nothing more.” So it is that Raskalnikov’s justificational acrobatics trace a roadmap of interpretation for our benefit. As his enthusiastic acquaintance goes on to say, “Nature isn’t taken into account, nature is driven out, nature is not supposed to be.” Which is entirely accurate because Socialism, in its quest to vanquish hierarchy and oppression, fails to recognize that we are always at war with ourselves. In rejecting the notion of a living soul, it reduces the human condition to unalloyed materialism.

Others are quick to interject their own opinions on these nascent ideals. Among them is Porfiry Petrovich, lead investigator of Alyona’s murder, who is duly fascinated by an article that his main suspect once published titled “On Crime.” Porfiry summarizes its thesis as follows:

“The ordinary must live in obedience and have no right to transgress the law, because they are, after all, ordinary. While the extraordinary have the right to commit all sorts of crimes and in various ways to transgress the law, because in point of fact they are extraordinary.”

To which its author replies:

“I merely suggested that an ‘extraordinary’ man has the right…that is, not an official right, but his own right, to allow his conscience to…step over certain obstacles, and then only in the event that the fulfillment of his idea—sometimes perhaps salutary for the whole of mankind—calls for it.”

Here, we are given insight into his intellectual straw grasping. For even as Raskalnikov expresses this sentiment, he must already know that the philosophy of fulfillment is, at best, a phonetically borrowed loan word in the translation of his life. Still, he is insistent on one thing:

“I only believe in my main idea. It consists precisely in people being divided generally, according to the law of nature, into two categories: a lower one, ordinary people, who are, so to speak, material serving solely for the reproduction of their own kind; and people proper—that is, those who have the gift or talent of speaking a new word in their environment.”

Phrased differently, instead of simply reproducing through what is natural, the extraordinary creates something out of nothing through what is supernatural. Raskalnikov fancies himself, or at least would like to be, one of those “extraordinary” people who reject God yet wish to hold His power.

And so, his search for redemption ends up being a recapitulation of what makes him so flawed in the first place: namely, his humanity. Unable to take Nihilism to its most logical conclusion yet incapable of playing the role of the young radical, either, he is forced to choose between himself and…himself. With nowhere left to run but inward, he cracks his conscience open like an egg, scrambles the contents, and throws them into the gaping mouths of his listeners. Among those caught in his defenestrations is Sonya Semyonova Marmeladov, the daughter of a former official-turned-alcoholic.

During a climactic meeting with Sonya, Raskalnikov asks her to read to him the account of Jesus raising Lazarus from the dead, as recorded in chapter 11 of the Gospel of John. In listening to it, he is met by his greatest adversary: God himself. He may not believe in the Bible, but the weight of it is too much for his feeble shoulders. Even in a mind pierced by existential ennui, he has to admit that some things are best left untouched. Either way, the “second chance” offered in Lazarus’s resurrection is undeniably alluring to the bedraggled idealist, who leverages this intimate connection with Sonya as an opportunity to impatiently unlock too many doors in the advent calendar of his heart far ahead of Christmas, so to speak. When he tells her that “it wasn’t a human being I killed, it was a principle!” he is at once revealing his weakness and the fact that his remorse has nothing to do with the crime itself but with its aftermath. But no such act can occur in a vacuum, and this realization pains him to no end. In his attempts to blame the demonic for choices that were ultimately his own, he is no different than the “ordinary” people of his disdain.

At the same time, he is assaulted by an all-consuming apathy, which is, beyond the carnival laughter that is the novel’s leitmotif, the key signature of his life. As our narrator would have it: “Evil is the final ambiguity. Reason cannot accept it; rationalizing ideologies denies its existence.” In light of this, we can see that indifference is the greatest horror, as typified by the following narratorial observation: “His heart was empty and blank. He did not want to reflect. Even his anguish had gone; and not a trace remained of his former energy, when he had left the house determined to ‘end it all!’ Total apathy had taken its place.”

In reading this, I was reminded of what English preacher Charles Spurgeon, who was sermonizing at the same time Dostoevsky was penning his novel, and for whom indifference or lethargy was one of the most wicked influences on the convicted soul and something to be struggled against:

“I would far rather have a man an earnest, intense opposer of the gospel than have him careless and indifferent. You cannot do much with a man if he will not speak about religion, or will not come to hear what you have to say concerning the things of God. You might as well have him a downright infidel, like a very leviathan covered with scales of blasphemy, as have him a mere earth-worm wriggling away out of reach.”

We might easily lay this polemical transparency over Raskalnikov’s life, which marks time by the rhythms of a dank and battered city, itself a force of influence on almost every page.Appropriately enough, it takes the utterly deplorable Arkady Ivanovich Svidrigailov, former employer of Raskalnikov’s sister and an unrepentant sensualist, to give us an accurate characterization of the same when he soliloquizes: “One seldom finds a place where there are so many gloomy, sharp, and strange influences on the soul of man as in Petersburg.”

Not one to be proselytized to, Raskalnikov is quick to call out Svidrigailov for enigmatizing an environment that feeds so readily into his lecherous lifestyle. To this, Svidrigailov replies:

“In this debauchery there’s at least something permanent, even based on nature, and not subject to fantasy, something that abides in the blood like a perpetually burning coal, eternally inflaming, which for a long time, even with age, one may not be able to extinguish so easily. Wouldn’t you agree that it’s an occupation of sorts?”

From the perspective of one who has no real occupation (when asked at one point what he does for work, he responds, “I think”), Raskalnikov knows there is nothing to be had in this dialogue. Svidrigailov’s solution to their intellectual quagmire is to proclaim that “what every man of us needs is air, air, air, sir.” However, this is a false proposition, for where can one find air in a place that suffocates by default?

As the most obvious foil for Raskalnikov, Svidrigailov exaggerates some of his traits while subverting others in aggregate. He makes no excuses for himself and, if anything, seems to rather enjoy his position of authority insofar as he, too, is able to deprive others of breath without apparent consequence. At one point in their exchange, he also offers the clearest characterization of Raskalnikov himself:

“You walk out of the house with your head still high. After twenty steps you lower it and put your hands behind your back. You look but apparently no longer see anything either in front of you or to the sides. Finally you begin moving your lips and talking to yourself, sometimes freeing one hand and declaiming, and finally you stop in the middle of the street for a long time.”

In addition to painting him in stark likeness, and because he renders what was once a private detail into a barbed fact, he exposes the hypocrisy of Nihilism, which is supposed to be a net positive by treating everything (and everyone) as expendable, liberating the self from the shackles of accountability. And yet, Raskalnikov is constantly seeking judgment, inviting it from near and far, all the while shocked at his own insolence for letting certain incriminating details slip. The effect is such that he constantly attributes meetings to chance and miracle (“it was as if someone had come to his service”) when it’s clear he had a conscious hand in their denouement. Even when he tries to rationalize his violence through some sort of Robin Hood complex (“For one life, thousands of lives saved from decay and corruption”), he goes against the grain of his faith by upholding a moral good.

What distinguishes Nihilism from the Postmodernism of today is that, where the former avows that everything is equally meaningless, the latter claims that everything is equally meaningful. Common to both extremes, however, is the broken promise that either can be a viable escape from the suffering of living in a world bound by sin. What he fears the most is being thought of as innocent, which is why he is so perplexed by how he attracts sympathy and affection without even trying. “But why do they love me so, when I’m unworthy of it!” he cries toward the novel’s conclusion. “Oh, how I hate them all!” If anything, however, his hatred is not of people but of the mercy they carry like a cross, for it is the middle ground he cannot bear to inhabit. By the same token, mercy is the only possibility for redemption and shows that he was never cut out to be a dutiful anarchist. As Dostoevsky so eloquently phrases it: “He would have given anything in the world to be left alone, yet he felt himself that he could not have remained alone for a minute.”

As Raskalnikov gets closer to the possibility of a turnaround, he cannot entertain his lack of resolve as anything other than a failure of principle. Unlike the men of influence he admires from afar, whose exploits were never punished and who “endured their steps” with profound and domineering indifference, he grants himself no right to take that step, and this he regards as his greatest crime: not that he took a human life but that he failed to endure his own steps, deferring instead to confession.

If the only chance at escape is to hit rock bottom, if appreciating life is built on denying its inherent value, then he must be willing to undergo the ideological detox that primes him for love’s fresh coat of paint. Because no matter how much he may deny it, we were never designed to live alone.

*The images in this review were created using artificial intelligence (specifically, ChatGPT). The words they accompany were created using actual intelligence (specifically, my own).